Supreme Court Rules Section 11 Court Cannot Extend Arbitrator's Mandate Under Section 29A

The Supreme Court has ruled that a High Court appointing arbitrators under Section 11 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1996 cannot extend the mandate of the tribunal under Section 29A, deciding Civil Appeal No. 9313 of 2026 with Civil Appeal No. 9325 of 2026 in South Bihar Power Distribution Company Ltd. v. India Power Corporation Ltd. and another. A Bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar held that the extension power belongs only to the court as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the statute. The ruling set aside the view taken by the Patna High Court on that point of jurisdiction.

It dismissed the appeals filed by South Bihar Power Distribution Company Ltd. and vacated its interim order dated February 12, 2024 staying the making of the award. The sole arbitrator, former Chief Justice of India Justice Dipak Misra, must now pass the award within six weeks. No further pleadings were allowed. The Court said the arbitration must move to its final stage without fresh extension pleas before the wrong forum.

Section 11 covers appointment of arbitrators when parties cannot agree on constitution of the tribunal. Section 29A sets the timeline for making the award and provides for extension of the mandate in defined circumstances. Section 2(1)(e) defines court for domestic arbitration. The question was whether a High Court that had acted under Section 11 kept any authority to grant extra time under Section 29A once the tribunal was in place.

Referral court is not extension court

No, the Court said. Jurisdiction under Section 11 ends with the appointment. Once that order is made, the appointing court is functus officio for supervision of the proceedings. The power to extend time under Section 29A rests with a different court — the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the district, or a High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction where it has such jurisdiction. A High Court acting only under Section 11 does not meet that test.

On that basis, the Bench set aside the Patna High Court finding that an extension plea could be filed before the High Court in its Section 11 capacity. Appointment, the Supreme Court said, does not carry a continuing power to control the tribunal's calendar. Parties seeking more time must approach the forum named in the definition clause, with proof of cause and in the manner set out in Section 29A.

In day-to-day work under the Arbitration Act 1996 India as it applies to domestic arbitrations, counsel often return to the same High Court that appointed the tribunal because the file number is known and the history is familiar. The judgment closes that route. Counsel must now identify the correct principal district court or the High Court with original side jurisdiction, file the extension plea there, and satisfy that court on the record. An order passed by a Section 11 court on such a plea would be without jurisdiction and open to challenge.

Time limits under Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1996

Under the Indian Arbitration Act 1996, Section 29A was brought in to stop open-ended proceedings and push tribunals toward time-bound awards. Extension is allowed only through a court application and on sufficient cause. The Supreme Court's reading keeps that control with the court closest to execution and evidence, not with the appointing court whose task ends with constitution of the tribunal. The statute assigns separate roles to separate forums at separate stages.

The Bench also refused to interfere with the decisions on two other objections from the distribution company. One related to the original clause providing for a three-member tribunal. The courts below had treated that requirement as waived in the circumstances in which a sole arbitrator came to be appointed, and the Supreme Court upheld that view. The reference to Justice Misra sitting alone was therefore allowed to stand. A party that takes part in the appointment of a sole arbitrator without preserving objection cannot later demand a fresh three-member panel.

A second objection concerned the right of the corporate debtor to pursue arbitration. The courts below had held that insolvency or corporate distress by itself did not bar the debtor from seeking adjudication of arbitrable claims through the agreed process. The Supreme Court agreed. It said arbitration remains available for contractual disputes even where the company faces financial strain, unless a binding moratorium or statute specifically bars the claim. Questions of enforceability were left for a later stage.