Supreme Court Clarifies Section 69 BNS: Promise to Marry Must Show Fraudulent Intent from Outset

Supreme Court of India Clarifies Section 69 BNS: Fraudulent Intent Must Exist at Promise's Outset

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India has drawn a sharp distinction between deception and disappointment in cases involving broken promises to marry, holding that criminal liability under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) cannot rest on a promise made in good faith that is later abandoned due to changed circumstances.

In Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat, 2026 news reports SC 1818, the Court examined the scope of Section 69 BNS in the context of allegations that sexual relations were established on the promise of marriage. The judgment clarifies that a person accused of such conduct cannot be prosecuted merely because they subsequently refused or failed to fulfil that promise. Instead, the prosecution must demonstrate material evidence that the promise to marry was made without any intention of fulfilling it at the time the promise was made.

The Court quashed the FIR in the case, finding that the allegations disclosed nothing more than a consensual relationship. This ruling will reshape how courts evaluate promise-to-marry cases under the new criminal code, particularly in distinguishing genuine relationships that later falter from relationships built on deliberate deception from their inception.

Fraudulent intent must be proven at the outset

The judgment establishes that fraudulent intent is a prerequisite element for prosecution under Section 69 BNS. This means the promise to marry must be made with the knowledge and intention that it will never be fulfilled. A person who makes a sincere promise to marry at the time of making it, but later changes their mind or circumstances intervene, does not fall within the scope of the provision.

The Court's reasoning recognises that relationships are complex and that circumstances change. People who genuinely intend to marry at one point may later decide they are incompatible, face family opposition, or discover reasons why the relationship cannot continue. These situations, however painful for the other party, do not constitute criminal fraud under Section 69 BNS.

What the provision targets is a different scenario: the person who never intended to marry from the outset but made the promise as a means to establish sexual relations. The distinction hinges entirely on the state of mind at the time the promise was made, not on what happens afterwards.

Burden of proof and material evidence

By requiring material evidence of initial fraudulent intent, the Court has placed a significant evidentiary burden on the prosecution. Mere allegations that a promise was broken are insufficient. The prosecution must present evidence that demonstrates the accused's dishonest state of mind when the promise was made.

This could include communications, conduct, or statements made before or around the time of the promise that reveal the accused's true intentions. Evidence that the accused was already in a relationship with someone else, had explicitly told the complainant they never intended to marry, or had engaged in similar conduct with other persons might support an inference of fraudulent intent. However, a simple disagreement about whether a promise was made, or conflicting accounts of what was promised, does not meet this threshold.

The judgment thus requires courts to engage in careful factual analysis before allowing a case to proceed to trial. At the stage of examining the FIR or considering bail applications, courts must assess whether the material presented genuinely suggests fraudulent intent from the outset or merely describes a relationship that ended unhappily.

Distinguishing genuine promises from deception

The Court's approach acknowledges that distinguishing a genuine promise later broken from a fraudulent promise is not always straightforward. However, the judgment makes clear that the law cannot treat these situations identically. To do so would criminalise broken hearts and convert relationship disputes into criminal matters by default.

Consider two scenarios. In the first, a man and woman are in a relationship, he promises to marry her, they engage in sexual relations, and later he decides he does not wish to marry her. In the second, a man enters into a relationship with a woman with the sole purpose of obtaining sexual favours, makes a false promise to marry knowing he will never do so, and then abandons her. The law, as clarified by the Court, must treat these differently.

In the first scenario, even if the woman feels betrayed and deceived by the change of heart, the criminal law should not intervene unless evidence shows the promise was false from the beginning. In the second scenario, the criminal law has a role because the promise itself was a fraud.

Impact on promise-to-marry prosecutions

This judgment will influence how courts approach a large category of cases that have become increasingly common in Indian criminal courts. Promise-to-marry cases, often filed by women who allege that men promised marriage to secure sexual relations and then refused to fulfil that promise, will now be subject to stricter scrutiny at the threshold stage.

Courts examining FIRs in such cases must now ask: Is there material evidence suggesting the promise was made without any intention of fulfilling it at the time it was made? If the answer is no, and the case merely describes a relationship that ended with the man refusing to marry, the FIR should not survive.

This does not mean the Court has closed the door on prosecution in such cases. It means the door remains open only where genuine fraud can be established. The judgment protects both the accused from frivolous prosecution and the genuine victims of fraud from dismissal of their complaints.