Karnataka High Court Rules Section 69 BNS Sexual Intercourse Charge Not Applicable to Women Accused

The Karnataka High Court has ruled that the offence of sexual intercourse by false promise of marriage under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, cannot be applied to a woman accused. Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde quashed the charge against a woman named as the second accused in an FIR, finding that the offence is inherently gender-specific and does not extend to female perpetrators based on the statutory language and legislative intent.

The court partly allowed a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Justice Hegde directed that investigation into the remaining alleged offences against the woman should continue, effectively bifurcating the charges and proceeding against her only on those counts where she could be prosecuted under law.

Section 69 BNS and its scope

Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita addresses sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means, specifically including a false promise of marriage. The provision is rooted in the earlier Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, which has long been interpreted as an offence primarily directed at male perpetrators engaging in deceptive conduct to obtain sexual consent from women.

The statutory framework distinguishes between different categories of non-consensual sexual conduct. This particular offence targets situations where consent is procured through fraudulent representation, most commonly a false assurance of marriage. The legislative history and textual construction of the section contemplate a victim-perpetrator dynamic that has traditionally aligned with gender roles.

Justice Hegde's ruling addresses a gap in application: whether a woman can be prosecuted under this section when she herself engages in similar deceptive conduct. The court concluded that the statutory language and structure of Section 69 BNS do not permit such application to female accused persons.

The court's textual analysis

The High Court's analysis focused on the gender-specific nature of the offence as framed in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The section, as drafted, contemplates sexual intercourse obtained through false promise of marriage, with the implicit understanding that the offence targets a particular class of perpetrator. The court did not elaborate on whether this distinction reflects biological impossibility, statutory construction, or legislative policy, but the ruling makes clear that female accused cannot be prosecuted under this specific provision.

This interpretation aligns with how courts have historically read similar provisions in criminal law. The distinction between who can commit an offence and who can be victimized by it remains a fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence. The court's approach suggests that Section 69 BNS, as currently drafted, does not contemplate women as potential offenders under this particular charge.

The partial allowance of the petition meant that while the Section 69 charge was quashed, the court did not dismiss the FIR entirely. Other charges against the woman accused were to be investigated and pursued according to law. If the woman committed other offences—whether under different sections of the BNS or under other applicable laws—she would not escape prosecution merely because one specific charge could not be sustained.

Guidance for prosecutors and investigators

The ruling clarifies an important point of criminal law interpretation: that offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita must be read according to their specific statutory language and cannot be stretched to cover situations the legislature did not contemplate. This principle of strict construction protects accused persons from overly broad application of criminal statutes, a safeguard that remains central to criminal jurisprudence.

For investigating officers and prosecutors, the decision provides guidance on charge-sheeting. When a woman is accused of conduct that might superficially appear to fall under Section 69 BNS, officers must carefully examine whether the statutory elements actually apply or whether alternative charges might be more appropriate. Misdirecting charges wastes court time and can result in quashing of charges at the preliminary stage, as occurred here.

The ruling also reflects the court's role in exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS, which permit courts to quash charges when they are unsustainable in law or when continuing them would amount to abuse of the process of court. Justice Hegde's decision demonstrates how these powers operate in practice: a court may strike down specific charges while allowing investigation and prosecution to continue on other viable counts.

Statutory construction and legislative intent

The decision touches on a broader question in criminal law: how statutes drafted with specific gender assumptions should be applied as social understanding changes. Section 69 BNS, like its predecessor in the IPC, was drafted in an era when certain crimes were assumed to be committed predominantly or exclusively by men.

Justice Hegde's approach opts for textual fidelity rather than expansive reinterpretation. This reflects a judicial philosophy that if the legislature wishes to expand a provision's scope, it should do so explicitly rather than leaving courts to infer such expansion. The court's role is to interpret the law as written, not to rewrite it according to contemporary values.

If Parliament or the state legislature believes that women should be prosecutable under Section 69 BNS, it can amend the statute to make this clear. Until such amendment occurs, courts must apply the law as it stands. The ruling thus leaves the door open for legislative reform while maintaining fidelity to current statutory language.